Whistleblowing and Free Speech: Garcetti\u27s Early Progeny and Shrinking Constitutional Rights of Public Employees by McGuinness, J. Michael
Touro Law Review 
Volume 24 Number 3 Article 5 
April 2014 
Whistleblowing and Free Speech: Garcetti's Early Progeny and 
Shrinking Constitutional Rights of Public Employees 
J. Michael McGuinness 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Labor and 
Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
McGuinness, J. Michael (2014) "Whistleblowing and Free Speech: Garcetti's Early Progeny and Shrinking 
Constitutional Rights of Public Employees," Touro Law Review: Vol. 24 : No. 3 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss3/5 
This Selected Excerpts: Practising Law Institute's Annual Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation Program is brought to 
you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro 
Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact 
lross@tourolaw.edu. 
Whistleblowing and Free Speech: Garcetti's Early Progeny and Shrinking 
Constitutional Rights of Public Employees 
Cover Page Footnote 
24-3 
This selected excerpts: practising law institute's annual section 1983 civil rights litigation program is available in 
Touro Law Review: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss3/5 
WHISTLEBLOWING AND FREE SPEECH:
GARCETTI's EARLY PROGENY AND SHRINKING
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
J. Michael McGuinness*
INTRODUCTION
"We have been betrayed and the guilty should not go unpun-
ished."' This was Senator Strom Thurmond's message in 1948. This
mentality is not just a South Carolina relic from more than half a cen-
tury ago, but now permeates public employment law throughout
America. In 2006, the United States Supreme Court embraced this
Thurmond doctrine in Garcetti v. Ceballos2 by denying speech pro-
tection to a prosecutor who reported police misconduct.3
This presentation is dedicated to two great Americans. First
is Richard Ceballos, who was an honorable prosecutor with the cour-
age to do what was required of him-report police misconduct.4
Second is Ms. Shirlie Green, a Chief Jailer in Georgia, who had the
* The McGuinness Law Firm, www.mcguinnesslaw.com; B.A., cum laude, University of
North Carolina, 1979; J.D., North Carolina Central University, 1983. Mr. McGuinness is a
member of the United States Supreme Court Bar, District of Columbia Bar, Massachusetts
Bar, North Carolina Bar, and various circuit courts of appeals. This Article is based on a
presentation given at the Practising Law Institute's Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation Pro-
gram in New York, New York.
1 NADINE COHODAS, STROM THURMOND & THE POLITICS OF SOUTHERN CHANGE 157
(1993).
2 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
3 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
4 See id. at 420-22.
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audacity to testify truthfully under oath against her employer who
subsequently fired her due to the content of her testimony.' In Green
v. Barrett, the Eleventh Circuit strictly adhered to Garcetti and held
that the Constitution does not protect Ms. Green for testifying about
unsafe conditions in a jail.6
The latest trends in public employment cases reveal a steadily
shrinking base of available federal constitutional protection. Due
process protections have been whittled away. Traditional First
Amendment protection for whistleblowers has now been effectively
gutted. Equal protection rights remain few and difficult to effectively
enforce.7 These trends have provided many more tools for abusive
bureaucrats to retaliate, discriminate and oppress. This Article ad-
dresses free speech rights of public employees including the recent
retreat of such protection in Garcetti.
To establish an actionable public employee First Amendment
claim, there must be protected expression and a causally related ad-
verse employment action. Protected expression is expression on a
matter of public concern plus a favorable application of the balancing
test.8 Public concern, traditionally, is any matter which relates to a
5 See Green v. Barrett, 226 F. App'x 883, 884 (2007).
6 Id. at 886 ("Green's testimony was given pursuant to her official duties as Chief Jailer.
Therefore, it is not protected by the United States Constitution. Barrett's firing of Green did
not violate Green's First Amendment right to free speech.").
7 See generally Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 478 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2007), cert.
granted, 128 S. Ct. 977 (2008) (mem). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case
where the Ninth Circuit categorically excluded public employment from the reach of the
class-of-one equal protection theory. Id. All other Circuits who have addressed the issue
have held that the class-of-one rule applies to public employment. If the Ninth Circuit is af-
firmed, another devastating blow will be dealt to public employees.
8 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (explaining the test requires a bal-
ancing between the interests of the public employer in free speech and the interest of the
government in ensuring efficiency).
530 [Vol. 24
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political, social, or other matter of interest to the community.9
I. LEADING SUPREME COURT PUBLIC EMPLOYEE ExPRESSION
CASES
Courts have developed several different First Amendment
tests a struggling public employee must meet to reach that ultimate
goal of a jury.' ° They are the public concern test," the balancing
test,'12 and the causation test. 3 Garcetti added another new test-the
official duty test. 14 In Garcetti, the Supreme Court issued a revolu-
tionary holding, restricting the constitutional rights to free expression
by public employees. 5 In a five-four decision, the majority created a
bright line per se rule: public employees do not enjoy protection for
expression made pursuant to their official employment duties.16
Even before Garcetti was decided, there were some general
rules in public employee speech cases. An employee may not be dis-
charged or otherwise adversely treated for the expression of ideas on
9 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
10 See Guilloty Perez v. Pierluisi, 339 F.3d 43, 50-51 (1st Cir. 2003) (summarizing a pub-
lic employee's First Amendment rights).
11 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 ("The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between
the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public ser-
vices it performs through its employees.")
12 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48 ("Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of
public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as
revealed by the whole record.").
13 Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (explain-
ing the causation test as a burden shifting analysis where the burden is initially placed on the
plaintiff to show that her conduct is protected under the constitution and the conduct was the
cause of plaintiff's employment termination).
14 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 ("We hold that when public employees make statements pur-
suant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer disci-
pline.").
1 Id. at 420-23.
16 Id. at421.
3
McGuinness: Whistleblowing and Free Speech: Garcetti's Early Progeny and Shri
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2008
532 TOURO LAWREVIEW [Vol. 24
any matter of public concern unless the public employer's interest in
the efficient and effective fulfillment of its responsibilities to the pub-
lic outweighs the employee's interest in free expression of the ideas.17
For a public employee to recover for adverse action allegedly
in retaliation for exercising the First Amendment right to free speech,
the employee must establish: (1) the speech complained of qualified
as protected speech or activity' 8 and (2) such protected speech or ac-
tivity was a substantial or motivating cause for the discharge.' 9
Before examining Garcetti, this Article discusses a handful of
Supreme Court cases which shape the parameters of speech protec-
tion for public employees.
A. Pickering v. Board of Education
In Pickering, the Supreme Court developed the balancing test
to determine the scope of First Amendment protection for public em-
17 See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994); Fox v. District of Columbia, 83
F.3d 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318 (2d Cir. 1996).
IS The Supreme Court has found certain expressive conduct, beyond verbal or written
communication, may constitute speech. E.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (in-
dicating silence may constitute speech); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (finding students wearing black armbands in protest of war constituted
expressive conduct under the First Amendment); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42
(1966) (holding a sit-in protest constitutes symbolic speech); Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821
(6th Cir. 1989) (finding that the grade a teacher assigns to a student constitutes protected
speech).
19 See Moore v. City of Kilgore, Texas, 877 F.2d 364, 369 (5th Cir. 1989); Jurgensen v.
Fairfax County, Virginia, 745 F.2d 868, 878 (4th Cir. 1984). See also J. Michael McGuin-
ness, Constitutional Employment Litigation: Trial of the Political Discharge Case, 43 AM
JUR TRIALS 1 (1991) (discussing evidentiary requirements of First Amendment political pa-
tronage claims). In Gerhart v. Hayes, 217 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2000), the Fifth Circuit ex-
plained that a First Amendment retaliation claim requires a showing that the plaintiff's
speech pertained to a matter of public concern and that the speech was a substantial or moti-
vating factor in the plaintiff's termination. A defendant may argue the termination was nev-
ertheless inevitable despite the plaintiff's speech. Gerhart, 217 F.3d at 321.
4
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ployees. 20 The Pickering balancing test has been reaffirmed by its
progeny and remains the determinative test for deciding what speech
by public employees is ultimately protected.
Pickering involved the publication of a letter to the editor in a
local newspaper by a school teacher. The teacher's letter was critical
of local school board's policy and the superintendent. 2' The letter
criticized the handling of bond issues and the allocation of financial
resources. The letter also alleged the superintendent "attempt[ed] to
prevent teachers ... from opposing or criticizing the proposed bond
issue. After a hearing before the school board, the teacher was
dismissed because the letter was found to have been "detrimental to
the efficient operation and administration" of the schools. Under
Pickering, courts must balance the interest of the state in promoting
efficiency in its public services against the interest of the employee in
commenting upon matters of public concern. 24
Before announcing the balancing test, the Pickering Court ob-
served that "because of the enormous variety of fact situations... we
do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a
general standard. .... 25 After considering the parties' competing in-
terests the Court observed that a public employee may not be pun-
ished for making statements on matters of public concern unless it is
established by the employer that the employee's statements caused
20 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
21 Id. at 564-66.
22 id.
23 Id. 564-65.
24 Id. at 568.
25 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569.
2008]
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substantial disruption to or interference with the performance of his
own duties or with the proper functioning of the employing public
agency.26
B. Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle
In Doyle, the Court addressed a First Amendment challenge
arising from a school board's refusal to renew a teacher's employ-
ment contract.27 The district court concluded that the teacher's exer-
cise of his right to free speech played a substantial part in the Board's
decision not to rehire him.28 The Court of Appeals affirmed.29 The
Supreme Court held that, although that constitutionally protected
conduct played a substantial part of the decision, it did not necessar-
ily constitute a First Amendment violation justifying remedial ac-
tion.3"
The Supreme Court held a public employer has a valid de-
fense if it can prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it nev-
ertheless would have taken the identical adverse employment action
in the absence of the public employee's protected conduct. 31  The
Court reasoned it is "necessary to formulate a test of causation which
distinguishes between a result caused by a constitutional violation
and one not so caused., 32
The Court summarized the principle from the case as follows:
26 Id. at 572-73.
27 Doyle, 429 U.S. at 276.
28 Id. at 283.
29 Id. at 276.
30 Id. at 285.
"' Id. at 287.
32 Doyle, 429 U.S. at 286.
534 [Vol. 24
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The public employee must initially establish that his or her expres-
sion was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse action.
Then, a public employer may successfully defend by proving "by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same
decision even in the absence of the protected conduct., 33
C. Connick v. Meyers
Fifteen years after Pickering, the Court appears to have less-
ened the degree of disruption required for a governmental employer
to regulate the speech of its employees. In Connick v. Meyers,34 the
plaintiff, an assistant district attorney, was told she was being consid-
ered for transfer to another section of the criminal court.35 The em-
ployee was concerned that compliance with that order would result in
a conflict of interest and she expressed her opposition to the proposed
transfer to the employer.36 Subsequently, a memorandum was issued
indicating that the employee was in fact being transferred. That eve-
ning, the employee prepared a questionnaire to solicit the views of
her fellow assistant district attorneys about the proposed transfer and
other matters of internal office policy.
37
The next day, the employee distributed the questionnaire in
the office. The employer decided to terminate Meyers after he re-
ceived a phone call informing him that Meyers was causing a "mini-
31 Id. at 287.
" 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
35 Connick, 461 U.S. at 140.
36 Id. at 141 n.l.
31 Id. at 141.
2008]
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insurrection" by her circulation of the survey.38 The employer in-
formed Meyers that she was being terminated because of her refusal
to accept the transfer and because he considered the distribution of
the questionnaire to have been an act of insubordination.39
Meyers filed suit alleging her employment was terminated be-
cause she had distributed the questionnaire and that her activity con-
stituted an exercise of free speech protected by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. 40 Although the employer claimed that Meyers
was dismissed because of her refusal to accept the transfer, the dis-
trict court found the questionnaire to be the substantial and motivat-
ing factor underlying the discharge. 4' The court applied the
Pickering balancing test and found that the issues presented in the
questionnaire related to the effective functioning of the district attor-
ney's office and therefore touched upon matters of public concern.42
Meyers' activities were neither substantially nor materially interfered
with the employer's interest in the efficient and effective operation of
the public services performed by its employees. 43 Accordingly, ap-
plying the balancing test, the district court held Meyers' conduct was
entitled to constitutional protection. 44
Having established that Meyers' conduct was protected and
constituted a motivating factor in the employer's decision to termi-
nate, the burden then shifted to the employer to prove it would have
38 id.
39 Id.
40 Connick, 461 U.S. at 141.
41 Id. at 141-42.
42 Id. at 143.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 154.
536 [Vol. 24
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dismissed Meyers regardless of her circulation of the questionnaire.
The court then applied the Mt. Healthy test, which places the initial
burden upon the employee to establish: (1) that his speech is consti-
tutionally protected and (2) that it was a substantial or motivating fac-
tor in the employer's decision.45 After this initial burden is met, the
employer may justify the discharge by showing, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that it would have reached the same decision even in
the absence of the protected conduct.46 Because Meyers was unable
to satisfy the Mt. Healthy burden, the district court granted relief to
the employee. The Fifth Circuit affirmed without opinion, but the
Supreme Court reversed.
The majority opinion in Connick observed that "government
offices could not function if every employment decision became a
constitutional matter., 47  Justice White's majority opinion distin-
guished speech concerning matters "inherently of public concern"
from speech that gains public concern status upon consideration of
the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement.48 The
surrounding circumstances standard takes into account "the content,
form and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole re-
cord."1
49
The Connick Court concluded that only one question in the
employee survey, which dealt with the pressure to work on the politi-
45 Connick, 461 U.S. at 149-50.
46 Id.
41 Id. at 143.
48 Id. at 148 n.8. Justice white distinguished the conduct of the employee in Connick
from the conduct of the employee in Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410
(1979).
49 Connick, 461 U.S. at 143.
5372008]
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cal campaigns of employer-supported candidates, was matter of pub-
lic concern. 5 ° Applying Pickering, the employer was given an oppor-
tunity to demonstrate that the employee's activity interfered with "the
interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of
the public service it performs through its employees.",5' The Court
found the burden placed upon the employer by the district court was
unduly onerous.52
D. Rankin v. McPherson
In Rankin v. McPherson,53 the Court observed that "whether
the employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern must be
determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as
revealed by the whole record., 54 The issue before the Court in Ran-
kin was whether an employee in a county constable's office was
properly discharged for remarking, after hearing of the attempted as-
sassination of President Reagan, "[I]f they go for him again, I hope
they get him."55
The Court in Rankin concluded the speech was constitution-
ally protected because the employer's interest in discharging the em-
ployee did not outweigh the employee's First Amendment rights.56
Rankin represents an expanded view of public concern broadly open-
ing the door for further protection of speech. Despite the unpleasant
50 See id. at 155.
I1 d. at 140.
52 Id. at 149-50.
3 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
54 Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384-85.
" Id. at 379-80.
56 Id. at 388.
538 [Vol. 24
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content of the speech, it involved a matter of public concern and was
therefore protected. Rankin explained, "Vigilance is necessary to en-
sure that public employers do not use authority over employees to si-
lence discourse., 5
7
E. Waters v. Churchill
Waters v. Churchil 8 arose out of the employee's communi-
cation about a controversial new nurse staffing program, known as
cross-training. Waters was displeased with Churchill's "opposition
to the hospital's improper implementation of a nurse cross-training
program, which Churchill was convinced was detrimental to the wel-
fare of patients in the obstetrical ward., 59 The Seventh Circuit set out
the dangers apparent to Churchill and others from the new nurse
staffing plan to demonstrate how the risks Churchill complained of
contravened fundamental standards of healthcare organizations.6 °
The precise communication at issue was disputed by the par-
ties. Relying upon unsubstantiated hearsay, the employer perceived
that Churchill was "knocking the department. "61 The employer fired
Churchill without ascertaining the true facts as to what Churchill ac-
tually said.
The Court observed, "We agree that it is important to ensure
not only that the substantive First Amendment standards are sound,
" Id. at 384.
58 Waters v. Churchill (Waters I/), 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
59 Churchill v. Waters (Waters 1), 977 F.2d 1114 (7th Cir. 1992).
60 Waters I, at 1116-20, 1122-23.
61 Waters 11, 511 U.S. at 665.
2008]
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but also that they are applied through reliable procedures. 62 The pri-
mary legal issues before the Court involved determining what proce-
dural and investigative mechanism, if any, must be followed in de-
termining what work place speech was involved. Before addressing
the procedural and investigative issues, the Court reaffirmed the his-
toric free speech protections for public employees. 63  "The First
Amendment demands a tolerance of 'verbal tumult, discord, and even
offensive utterance,' 'as necessary side effects of. . . the process of
open debate.' "64 The Court went on to explain, "Government em-
ployees are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies
for which they work; public debate may gain much from their in-
formed opinions." 6
5
The Waters II Court imposed a good faith standard upon em-
ployers for reaching their conclusions about what is said in the work
place speech disputes.66 If a public employer punishes an employee
without a reasonable investigation, the employer runs the risk of hav-
ing to remedy depriving the employee of constitutional rights.67
Waters II did not carve out a detailed test for the procedural
and investigative standards imposed upon public employers. Rather,
the Court's decision provides that a case-by-case basis must be em-
ployed to ascertain the extent of the procedural and investigative
rights required. This is the difficult part of the Court's opinion. Be-
62 Id. at 669.
63 See id.
64 Id. at 672 (internal citations omitted).
65 Id. at 674 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572).
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cause the Court did not specify particular procedures, litigation in the
lower courts will be necessary to flesh out what is required in particu-
lar situations. This determination will likely be addressed with expert
testimony from law enforcement labor experts.
Justice Scalia's dissent underscores the extent of the investi-
gative rights enunciated by the Court's opinion. Scalia pointed out
that the "right to an investigation before dismissal for speech ... ex-
pands the concept of 'First Amendment procedure' into brand new
areas ....",68 Scalia observed the employee rights articulated in the
Court's majority decision were not just procedural, but were rather
new substantive rights under the First Amendment.
Rather than adopt a general test to determine what procedural
safeguards were to be applied, the Court explained that a case-by-
case approach would be applied. Thus, the Court enunciated a "rea-
sonableness test" for the employer to meet to avoid infringing upon
free speech rights.69
Churchill has broad implications. It reaffirms and clarifies
the procedural component of the First Amendment which was very
unclear for over thirty years and enhances the need for experts to ex-
amine the employer's investigative process, to determine if the em-
ployer has acted reasonably.
F. City of San Diego v. Roe
In City of San Diego v. John Roe,7 ° the Court addressed a
68 Id. at 688 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 671 (majority opinion).
70 543 U.S. 77 (2004).
20081
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First Amendment challenge to the termination of a police officer for
selling video tapes which depicted him masturbating. 7' The video
tape showed the police officer stripping off a uniform, though that
uniform was apparently not the official San Diego Police Department
uniform. The officer also sold custom videos on eBay. His eBay
user profile identified him as being a police officer, and offered po-
lice equipment, including official uniforms of the San Diego Police
Department.73 A police supervisor discovered the officer's activities
and conducted a search for other items. 74 The Supervisor then recog-
nized the officer and reported him to the San Diego Police Depart-
ment.
Initially the San Diego Police Department ordered the police
officer to cease displaying, manufacturing, or selling any explicit sex-
ual videos, but he did not fully comply and was terminated accord-
ingly.75 The District Court concluded the officer had not sufficiently
demonstrated that his conduct qualified as protected expression. The
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the officer's conduct constituted
protected expression. 6
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and concluded
that the officer's expression was not protected under the First
Amendment.77 The Court reasoned that the officer took deliberate
steps to link his video tapes and other products to his police work in a
7' Roe, 543 U.S. at 78.
72 Id.
73 Id.
14 Id. at 78-79.
75 Id.
76 Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2004).
77 Roe, 543 U.S. at 85.
[Vol. 24542
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way that was injurious to his employer. 78 The Court identified sev-
eral factors to support this conclusion including the officer's use of
the uniform, the law enforcement reference in the website, and that
the depiction of the officer performing indecent acts while in the
course of official duties brought the mission of the police employer
and the professionalism of its officers into serious disrepute.7 9
The Ninth Circuit had noted the City conceded that the offi-
cer's activities were unrelated to his employment, but interpreted the
City's concession as implying the officer's speech was not a com-
ment on the working or functioning of the San Diego Police Depart-
ment.80 The Supreme Court found that this was quite a different
question than whether the speech was detrimental to the San Diego
Police Department. On that score, the City's consistent position had
been that the speech is contrary to its regulations and "harmful to the
proper functioning of the police force.",
8 1
The Court thought the matter fell squarely under Pickering
and Connick and applied the traditional public concern test, conclud-
ing that the officer's expression did not qualify as a matter of public
concern because the officer's "activities did nothing to inform the
public about any aspect of the SDPD's functioning or operation."
82
This was unlike the remarks at issue in Rankin, where one co-worker
commented to another about an item of political news; Roe's expres-
sion was "widely broadcast, linked to his official status as a police of-
78 Id. at81.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 79-80.
81 Id.
82 Roe, 543 U.S. at 84.
2008] 543
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ficer, and designed to exploit his employer's image. 83 Further, the
speech was more than just exploitive, it was "detrimental to the mis-
sion and functions of the employer.,
84
II. GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS
In Garcetti, the Supreme Court issued a revolutionary deci-
sion, which has fundamentally changed the landscape of public em-
ployment law for those who might dare report government fraud,
waste, corruption, or abuse.85  The Court held a public employee
whistleblower does not enjoy First Amendment protection for report-
ing governmental misconduct if the report is made within the broad
sphere of that employee's official duties.86
Justice Kennedy authored the five-four Garcetti decision. In
Justice Kennedy's America, public employees are no longer pro-
tected by the First Amendment for doing their jobs and reporting ap-
parent misconduct. 87 Following Garcetti, jailers who testify that their
jails are unsafe are now stripped of the protection they have enjoyed
for decades.88
Richard Ceballos was employed since 1989 as a Deputy Dis-
trict Attorney for the Los Angeles County District Attorney's office.
Ceballos, who held a supervisory role, was contacted by a criminal
83 Id.
84 Id. at 85. For subsequent cases relying upon Roe, see Brooks v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of
Regents, 406 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 2005) and Carreon v. Ill. Dep 't of Human Servs., 395 F.3d
786 (7th Cir. 2005). See also Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech,
99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1007 (2005).
85 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
86 Id.
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defense attorney, who alleged inaccuracies in an affidavit in support
of a search warrant in a pending criminal case.89 The defense attor-
ney informed Ceballos that he had filed a motion to challenge the
warrant, but he also requested that Ceballos review the case. Cebal-
los examined the affidavit, visited the location that it described, and
determined that the affidavit contained serious misrepresentations.9"
Thereafter, Ceballos spoke by telephone with the affiant in
support of the warrant, a deputy sheriff, and received an unsatisfac-
tory explanation for the perceived inaccuracies. Consequently, Ce-
ballos relayed his observations to his supervisors and followed up
with a written memorandum explaining his concerns and recom-
mending dismissal of the criminal case.9'
A meeting was scheduled for Ceballos, his supervisors, the
deputy sheriff executing the affidavit, and other employees from the
Sheriffs Department. The meeting became heated and one lieutenant
harshly criticized Ceballos for his handling of the case.92
The supervisors decided to proceed with the prosecution and
the trial court held a hearing on the motion challenging the warrant.
Ceballos was called as a witness by the criminal defendant, and testi-
fied to his observations about the affidavit; the trial court rejected the
challenge to the warrant.93
In the aftermath, Ceballos was subjected to a series of adverse
employment actions, which he believed were retaliatory. The actions
" Id. at413.
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included reassignment from his calendar deputy position to a trial
deputy position, transfer to another court house, and denial of a pro-
motion. After initiating an unsuccessful internal employment griev-
ance, Ceballos filed suit in the federal court alleging retaliation in
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.94
The district court granted summary judgment for the defen-
dants, reasoning that Ceballos prepared his memorandum pursuant to
his official employment duties, which the court reasoned precluded
constitutional protection.95 The Ninth Circuit reversed and held the
allegations of wrongdoing constituted protected speech under the
First Amendment. In so finding, the Ninth Circuit followed the tradi-
tional approach-first analyzing public concern, then applying the
balancing test. 96  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and re-
versed.97
The Supreme Court began its analysis by observing that
Pickering v. Board of Education provides a useful starting point in
explaining the Court's doctrine. The relevant speech in Pickering
was a school teacher's letter to a newspaper addressing issues involv-
ing the funding policies of the school board.98 In Pickering, the
Court observed the problem in any case is to effectively strike a bal-
ance between the interest of the employee, as a citizen, in comment-
ing upon matters of public concern and the interest of the state, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of public services it performs
94 Id.
9' Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 415.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 417.
98 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564.
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through its employees. 99
The Garcetti Court observed that Pickering and its progeny
provided two inquiries to guide the interpretation of constitutional
protection for expression afforded to public employees. The first re-
quires determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a mat-
ter of public concern. If not, then the employee enjoys no First
Amendment protection. If the public concern threshold is satisfied,
then the issue becomes whether the government has an adequate jus-
tification for treating the employee differently from other citizens,
followed by the balancing test which determines whether the speech
is constitutionally protected. 100
In Garcetti, the Court made a number of observations regard-
ing factors that were identified as either being not dispositive or dis-
positive in public employee free expression claims. First, the fact
that Ceballos' expressed his views inside his office and privately,
rather than publicly, was not deemed to be dispositive by the
Court. 1° 1 "[E]mployees in some cases may receive First Amendment
protection for expressions made at work."'1 2 Thus, one can still re-
tain citizen status while at work. That the memorandum concerned
the subject matter of Ceballos' employment was also not disposi-
tive. °3 "The First Amendment protects some expression related to
the speaker's job."' 4 Finally, the Court observed that
99 Id. at 568.
100 Id.
'Ol Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 411.
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the controlling factor in Ceballos' case is that his ex-
pressions were made pursuant to his duties as a calen-
dar deputy .... That consideration-the fact that Ce-
ballos spoke as a prosecutor fulfilling a responsibility
to advise his supervisor about how best to proceed
with a pending case-distinguishes Ceballos' case
from those in which the First Amendment provides
protection against discipline. We hold that when pub-
lic employees make statements pursuant to their offi-
cial duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens
for First Amendment purposes and the Constitution
does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline. 105
The Court explained the importance of the job-related quality
of the memorandum when it noted
Ceballos wrote his memo because that is part of what
he, as a calendar deputy, was employed to do. The
significant point is that the memo was written pursuant
to Ceballos' official duties. Restricting speech that
owes its existence to a public employee's professional
responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the em-
ployee might have enjoyed as private citizen.'06
Ceballos did not act as a citizen when he went about conduct-
ing his daily professional activities such as supervising attorneys, in-
vestigating charges and preparing filings.0 7 Similarly, Ceballos did
not communicate as a citizen by writing a memorandum that ad-
dressed the proper disposition of a pending criminal case.
The Court explained that employees who make public state-
105 Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
106 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421-22.
107 Id. at 422.
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ments outside the course of performing their official duties retain
some possibility of First Amendment protection because that is the
kind of activity engaged in by citizens who do not work for the gov-
ernment.10 8 The dispositive point of eliminating constitutional pro-
tection is "[w]hen a public employee speaks pursuant to employee re-
sponsibilities."1 09
Three separate dissenting opinions were issued. The majority
addressed some of the analysis from Justice Souter's compelling dis-
sent, which was joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg. Justice
Souter stated that he expected
one response from the Court's holding will be misused
by government employers to expand stated job de-
scriptions to include more official duties and so ex-
clude even some currently protectable speech from the
First Amendment purview . . . the government may
well try to limit the English teachers' options by the
simple expedient of defining teachers' job responsi-
bilities expansively, investing them with a general ob-
ligation to ensure sound administration of the
school. 1 0
In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy, writing for the
Court, stated:
[W]e reject, however, the suggestion that employers
can restrict employees' rights by creating excessively
broad job descriptions. The proper inquiry is a practi-
cal one. Formal job descriptions often bear little re-
semblance to the duties an employee actually is ex-
108 Id. at 423.
109 Id. at 424.
110 Id. at 431 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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pected to perform, and the listing of a given task in an
employee's written job description is neither necessary
nor sufficient to demonstrate that conducting the task
is within the scope of the employee's professional du-
ties for First Amendment purposes."'
In Ceballos, the Supreme Court enunciated a clear bright line:
statements made pursuant to an employee's official duties are not
protected under the First Amendment."l 2 The point left for interpreta-
tion by lower courts appears to be the scope of official duties.
Despite the majority's recognition of the importance of expos-
ing governmental inefficiency and misconduct, the Court in Garcetti
promulgated a new and significantly more restrictive principle of
First Amendment jurisprudence for public employees, which repre-
sents a substantial erosion of speech protection for public employees.
HI. GARCETTI'S EARLY PROGENY
A. Casey v. West Las Vegas Independent School District
The Tenth Circuit, in Casey v. West Las Vegas Independent
School District,"3 exemplifies how Garcetti profoundly altered
courts' review of First Amendment retaliation claims. Upon becom-
ing the superintendent, Casey assumed responsibility for serving as
the chief executive officer of the District's Head Start program, a
federally-funded initiative aimed at providing educational opportuni-
ties, meals and health care services for low income children between
".. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424-25 (majority opinion) (internal citations omitted).
112 Id. at 421.
13 473 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 2007).
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three and five years of age." 4
Casey learned the "staff had begun to uncover evidence that
as many as 50% of the families enrolled in the District's Head Start
program appeared to have incomes that were too high for them to
qualify for participation."" 5 Casey, concerned these issues could put
risk future federal funding at risk, reported them to Walter Adams,
the President of West Las Vegas School Board. Adams initially re-
sponded by telling Casey not to fret." 6 On several more occasions,
Casey raised the issue with Adams and in executive sessions with the
Board. "Each time, she was told variously not to worry about it, to
leave it alone or to not go there."' 17 Casey ultimately instructed her
subordinate to approach the federal Head Start regional office and re-
lay her findings.
"Casey also informed the Board that it was violating the New
Mexico Open Meetings Act by making personnel and other decisions
in executive session without proper notice and meeting agendas."" l , 8
Because the School Board members ignored her warnings, "Casey
filed a written complaint with the New Mexico Attorney General's
office."" 9 In response, "the Attorney General's Office wrote to Mr.
Adams outlining the particulars of Ms. Casey's complaint, enclosing
a copy of complaint, and requesting a response."'' 20 "[T]he Attorney
General's Office determined that the Board had in fact violated the
114 Casey, 473 F.3d 1323.
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Open Meetings Act and ordered corrective action."' 121 Finally, "Ms.
Casey brought to the Board's attention a number of other issues...
regarding the District's operations that, she believed, violated federal
or state laws."'
122
The Tenth Circuit carefully analyzed each of Casey's com-
munications and applied the Garcetti rule on a statement-by-
statement basis to analyze whether each statement was pursuant to
her official duties. The Casey court concluded: (1) Casey spoke as
an employee rather than a citizen when communicating with the
School Board about miscellaneous alleged violations of state or fed-
eral law; (2) Casey spoke as an employee when she conveyed to the
School Board her concern about the district's lack of compliance with
federal regulations governing the Head Start program; (3) Casey
spoke as a employee when she instructed a subordinate to contact the
federal authorities about illegal enrollments in the district's Head
Start program; and (4) Casey spoke as a district employee when she
communicated her concerns about the School Board's failure to com-
ply with the state open meetings law; and (5) Casey spoke as a citizen
when she wrote to the State Attorney General's office about alleged
violations of the state open meetings law.
2 1
As the Tenth Circuit explained, "the statements made to the
New Mexico Attorney General, however, are another kettle of
fish."' 124 The court reasoned, "Casey was not speaking to fulfill her
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1329, 1332, 1334.
124 Casey, 473 F.3d at 1332.
[Vol. 24
24
Touro Law Review, Vol. 24 [2008], No. 3, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss3/5
WHISTLEBLO WING AND FREE SPEECH
responsibility of advising the Board when she went to the Attorney
General's office."' 125 Rather, just the opposite was the case because
she had lost faith that the School Board would listen to advice so Ca-
sey took her grievance elsewhere. There was "no evidence in the
summary judgment record... suggesting that the Board ever... as-
signed Ms. Casey any responsibility for the Board's meeting prac-
tices. ' 12
6
Casey offers a highly analytical approach where the court
analyzed each communication in connection with whether that com-
munication was pursuant to the employee's official duties, therefore
applying the bright line test enunciated in Garcetti. The Tenth Cir-
cuit remanded for further consideration of interest balancing and cau-
sation issues. 1
27
B. Green v. Barrett
Green v. Barrett is a troublesome unpublished opinion from
the Eleventh Circuit. 128 Green worked as a supervisor in a county
jail, and testified about various security gaps and unsafe conditions,
apparently to the chagrin of the sheriff.129 The sheriff stated, "I was
so concerned about that testimony the chief gave that she was termi-
nated today.' 130 The Eleventh Circuit dismissed her claims and, cit-
ing Connick and Garcetti, determined that her testimony was offered
125 Id.
126 id.
27 Id. at 1334.
128 Green v. Barrett, 226 Fed. App'x at 883. Cf Kirby v. City of Elizabeth City, 388 F.3d
440 (4th Cir. 2005) (refusing to protect truthful testimony).




McGuinness: Whistleblowing and Free Speech: Garcetti's Early Progeny and Shri
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2008
TOURO LA WREVIEW
as part of her official duties. 3 '
C. Haynes v. City of Circleville
In Haynes v. City of Circleville,' the Sixth Circuit addressed
a law enforcement officer's free speech and other claims arising out
of the officer's communications protesting proposed cutbacks in ca-
nine training. Officer Haynes generally asserted that the reduction in
training would likely "cause an imminent risk of physical harm to the
public."' 133 When Haynes learned that the Chief of Police was about
to institute a significant reduction in training, he wrote a lengthy
memoranda expressing his displeasure at the reduction in training; ul-
timately, the officer was terminated. 134
In applying Garcetti, the Haynes court framed the issue as
"whether or not Haynes' expressions were made pursuant to his du-
ties as a canine handler and patrolman for Circleville.' ' 135 The Sixth
Circuit characterized the context of the officer's memoranda as that
of a "disgruntled employee upset that his professional suggestions
were not followed as they had been in the past."' 136
Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit concluded that "[iun lodging
his protest to Chief Gray against the training cutbacks, Haynes was
acting as a public employee carrying out his professional responsi-
bilities."' 37 Officer "Haynes had developed the standard operating
... Id. at 886-87.
132 474 F.3d 357 (6th Cir. 2007).
133 Haynes, 474 F.3d at 359.
114 Id. at 360.
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procedures for the canine unit and worked with his dog as a part of
his day-to-day professional activities."' 138 The court found the memo-
randa to Chief Gray was made pursuant to those professional duties,
and was therefore not protected under the First Amendment.
139
D. Green v. Board of Commissioners
The Tenth Circuit, in Green v. Board of Commissioners,140
addressed public employee expression claims which arose out of
communications by a drug lab and technician. Green's primary du-
ties were in the drug lab and as a part of her job, she performed drug
screening tests.' 4' Green became concerned that the Juvenile Justice
Center where she worked "did not have a confirmation testing policy,
and she raised her concerns to her direct supervisor" and a district
judge with administrative authority over the Center. 142 "Neither ap-
peared responsive to the issue, with the Judge" indicating that "if cli-
ents did like the results, they could go elsewhere and be tested.'
43
Green thereafter suspected that a particular drug test had yielded a
false positive.
Acting independently, Green reached out to the testing
equipment's manufacturer, seeking information and eventually ar-
ranged for independent confirmation testing. The results of the test-
ing indicated the initial test was a false positive. Green communi-
138 Haynes, 474 F.3d at 364.
139 Id.
140 472 F.3d 794 (10th Cir. 2007).
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cated this information to her supervisor, and procedures for additional
safeguards and testing were adopted by the center.144 "Green alleged,
that after this episode, her supervisors began treating her less favora-
bly," which ultimately led to a Section 1983 action alleging retalia-
tion against her for her expression.
45
The Tenth Circuit framed the issue as whether Green, by act-
ing independently in the confirmation testing arrangements, departed
from her employment duties and noted that the Garcetti Court did not
have occasion to articulate a comprehensive framework for defining
the scope of an employee's duties. 146
Much like the Court in Casey, the Tenth Circuit in Green
carefully delineated the speech in issue into four categories:
1) communications with the client regarding how to
obtain a confirmation test; 2) communications with the
testing equipment manufacturer about the confirma-
tion test; 3) communication with another individual to
ensure chain of custody for the sample to be used in
the confirmation test; and 4) communication with de-
fendants regarding the confirmation test's determina-
tion of a false positive. 147
Next, the court specifically identified the components of the
written job description for a drug lab technician. 148 Formal job de-
scriptions are certainly highly relevant, but as Garcetti explained,
they are not dispositive. The Tenth Circuit concluded Green's com-
144 id.
145 Id.
146 Green, 472 F.3d at 798.
141 Id. at 799.
141 Id. at 800.
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munications were similar to Garcetti and other cases from the Tenth
Circuit that rejected protection for the speech in issue.'49
Ms. Green was not communicating with newspapers
or her legislators or performing some similar activity
afforded citizens; rather even if not explicitly required
as part of her day-to-day job responsibilities, her ac-
tivities stemmed from and were the type of activities
that she was paid to do.'50
Each communication was analyzed to determine whether or
not it was part of her job. Green's speech was held to be unprotected
in light of the new Garcetti principle.'15 The test, or at least what the
Green court considered to be the dispositive language, was whether
the communication "stemmed from and were the type of activities
that she was paid to do."'' 52 Applying that test, it appears that most
speech that relates to any matter within the broad purview of issues,
circumstances and facts within public agencies can be fairly said to
stem from the employee's job duties or responsibilities.
E. Battle v. Board of Regents
The plaintiff employee, in Battle v. Board of Regents,'53 was
employed in the office of financial aid and veterans affairs at Fort
Valley State University. 54 She suspected fraud in the way the school
handled its federal work study program. As part of her employment
149 Id. at 800.
150 Id. at 800-01.
151 Green, 472 F.3d at 801.
152 Id.
' 468 F.3d 755 (11 th Cir. 2006).
114 Battle, 468 F.3d at 757.
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duties, she was responsible for the substantive accuracy of program
reports and for reporting any suspicions of fraud. After having some
files transferred to her, the plaintiff suspected fraudulent mishandling
and mismanagement of federal financial aid funds.
55
Although Battle never spoke to anyone outside the University
about the perceived fraudulent activity, she did confront internal em-
ployees about her suspicions and later met with the university's presi-
dent and informed him that information and documents were being
falsified. 156 Battle was later told her contract for her position as fi-
nancial aid counselor would not be renewed. A state audit later un-
covered "serious noncompliance with federal regulations."'
157
The plaintiff initiated a First Amendment retaliation claim.
58
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school;
the Eleventh Circuit applied Garcetti and affirmed, reasoning the
plaintiff admitted to an "employment duty to ensure the accuracy and
completeness of student files as well as to report any mismanagement
or fraud that she encounters in the student financial aid files."'
159
F. Freitag v. Ayers
In Freitag v. Ayers, 160 the Ninth Circuit addressed a case in-
volving a female corrections officer who alleged a hostile work envi-
ronment based on failure to stop male prisoners' sexual harassment of
155 Id.
156 Id. at 758-59.
117 Id. at 759.
158 Id.
"9 Battle, 468 F.3d at 761.
160 468 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2006).
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female officers and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.' 6'
The plaintiff sent a letter detailing her allegation to a Califor-
nia State Senator who in turn contacted the California Office of the
Inspector General and requested an investigation. Following the in-
vestigation, the Inspector General published a report of its investiga-
tion with findings that were uniformly and pointedly damning. 62
The plaintiff was suspended and later terminated. The jury found in
her favor, and the Ninth Circuit concluded there was sufficient evi-
dence for the jury to have found that her speech was a substantial mo-
tivating factor in the adverse actions. 63
Applying Garcetti, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plain-
tiff acted as a citizen when she communicated with the state senator
and the Inspector General regarding her complaints of sexual harass-
ment.164 The court reasoned that it was "not part of her official tasks
to complain to the Senator or the [Inspector General] about the state's
failure to perform its duties properly, and specifically its failure to
take corrective action to eliminate sexual harassment in the work
place." 165 Accordingly, she was found to have spoken as a citizen,
and her expression was constitutionally protected under the First
Amendment. 166
161 Freitag, 468 F.3d at 532.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 543.
'64 Id. at 545.
165 Id.
166 Freitag, 468 F.3d at 545.
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G. Skehan v. Village of Mamaroneck
The Second Circuit, in Skehan v. Village of Mamaroneck,167
addressed a First Amendment retaliation and equal protection chal-
lenge to the termination of police officers. The Skehan court charac-
terized the case as concerning "charges and counter charges of offi-
cial misconduct within the municipal police department and an
alleged effort by the chief of police and the governing commission to
silence subordinates."'
' 68
The plaintiffs alleged municipal officials "conspired to retali-
ate against them because the plaintiffs spoke out against what they
claimed was a pattern of serious misconduct by fellow officers and
subsequent cover-ups by" the chief of police and other high-ranking
officers. 169
The district court refused to grant qualified immunity and the
Second Circuit affirmed that denial of plaintiffs' First Amendment
retaliation claims.1 70 The defendants argued that reports to the Dis-
trict Attorney's office of an arrest made without probable cause and
of racially motivated law enforcement decisions were, under Gar-
cetti, made pursuant to official duties as a police officer.' 71 "Because
no factual record had been developed on the scope" of the officers'
duties, the Second Circuit expressed no view on this question and left
to the district court in the first instance to consider any application of
167 465 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2006).
168 Skehan, 465 F.3d at 101.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 108.
171 Id. at 106.
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Garcetti. 172
H. Mills v. City of Evansville
In Mills v. City of Evansville,173 the Seventh Circuit addressed
a police sergeant's communications with her supervisors. 174 Mills
was a sergeant with the Evansville Police Department with responsi-
bilities that included supervising crime prevention officers. The
Chief of Police decided to move some officers from crime prevention
duties to active patrol, and this reduced the number of crime preven-
tion officers under Mills' supervision. After the Chief described his
plan for these changes, Mills informed senior managers that the "plan
would not work, that community organizations would not let the
change happen, and that sooner or later they would have to restore
the old personnel assignment policies.' '175 Thereafter, a reprimand
was placed in Mills' personnel file and she was "removed from her
supervisory position and assigned to patrol duties," which caused
other losses.
17 6
Mills initiated a First Amendment retaliation claim. The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment for the police and the Seventh
Circuit affirmed, relying upon Garcetti's central proposition that,
when public employees make statements pursuant to their official du-
ties, they are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment pur-
172 Id.
17' 452 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2006).
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poses. 177
Mills "was on duty," the Seventh Circuit noted, "in uniform,
and engaged in discussion with her superiors, all of whom had just
emerged from the chiefs" briefing regarding his plan. 178 The Mills
court concluded, "She spoke in her capacity as a public employee
contributing to the formation and execution of official policy."'7 9
Her speech was therefore held to be unprotected.
I. Bailey v. Department of Elementary and Secondary
Education
In Bailey v. Department of Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion,180 the Eighth Circuit addressed a First Amendment retaliation
claim by a terminated employee of a state education department who
had a contract for consulting regarding state disability benefits
claims.' 8' In implementing some new procedures, the plaintiff em-
ployee "expressed concerns about what he believed to be a quota sys-
tem, contending that some claimants" were being awarded benefits to
which they were not entitled. 82 The employee spoke out to supervi-
sors and managers about his concerns and was ultimately terminated.
The jury returned a verdict in the plaintiffs favor, which was set
aside by the trial court; the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment for
the defendants as a matter of law. 83
"' Id. at 648.
178 id.
179 Mills, 452 F.3d at 648.
180 451 F.3d 514 (8th Cir. 2006).
181 Bailey, 451 F.3d at 516.
182 Id.
183 Id. at517, 522.
[Vol. 24
34
Touro Law Review, Vol. 24 [2008], No. 3, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss3/5
WHISTLEBLO WING AND FREE SPEECH
J. Andrew v. Clark
In Andrew v. Clark,184 the district court addressed a First
Amendment retaliation claim by a Baltimore police officer who had
served for more than thirty years. 85 The plaintiff was serving as a
Major and Commanding Officer when Baltimore police officers shot
and killed a man who had barricaded himself inside of his apartment.
The officer was disturbed about the manner in which the barricade
incident was handled and consequently prepared an internal memo-
randum outlining the events and then forwarded the memo up the
chain of command to the police commissioner.' 86 When the commis-
sioner did not respond, Andrew sent a copy of the memo to a Balti-
more Sun reporter. After the Sun published a story based on the
memo, Andrew was investigated by internal affairs and was charged
with releasing confidential information.187
Andrew conceded that as a police commander, he was "rou-
tinely required to provide an overview, findings and recommenda-
tions as to all significant incidents including shootings that occurred
within his district."'88  The district court interpreted the claim as
grounded upon Andrew's contention that by giving a copy of his
memo to the media "he converted what is undeniably speech effected
pursuant to his employment duties into 'citizen speech' on a 'matter
of public concern.' ,,189 The district court found nothing in Garcetti
184 472 F. Supp. 2d 659 (D. Md. 2007).
185 Andrew, 472 F. Supp, 2d at 659.
186 Id. at 660.
187 Id. at 660-61.
188 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
189 Id. at 662.
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or in post Garcetti cases to support this view.190 Applying Garcetti,
the action was dismissed. "No reasonable juror could reasonably find
that the 'internal memorandum' was other than 'speech pursuant to
plaintiffs official duties.' "'91
K. Benoit v. Board of Commissioners
In Benoit v. Board of Commissioners,'92 a district court ad-
dressed a First Amendment retaliation claim involving an attorney
who was allegedly retaliated against for writing certain letters.'93 The
plaintiff was employed by the New Orleans Levee District as senior
counsel to the Board of Commissioners. 194 He gave letters to Gover-
nor Kathleen Blanco and United States Senator David Vitter regard-
ing the way state officials in charge of New Orleans' levee system
conducted their activities and directed state funds in the period lead-
ing up to the massive destruction caused by hurricane Katrina.' 95 The
letters detailed a nearly $100,000 payment to the Board President.
Once the board learned of the letter, Benoit was suspended and even-
tually his resignation was forced.' 96
The district court found Benoit was acting-and thus speak-
ing-as a citizen when he sent the letters exposing the board's trans-
gressions because exposing the kind of transgressions he reported
190 Andrew, 472 F. Supp. 2d at 662.
191 Id. at 663.
192 459 F. Supp. 2d 513 (E.D. La. 2006).
193 Benoit, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 515. The case was before the court on several motions to
dismiss by the defendants, all of which were denied. Id. at 519.
194 Id. at 516.
" Id. at 515-16.
196 Id. at 516.
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was not technically part of his job.' 97
L. Shewbridge v. El Dorado Irrigation District
In Shewbridge v. El Dorado Irrigation District,198 the District
Court for the Eastern District of California addressed an alleged re-
taliation claim by employee who served as an engineer for a munici-
pal water district.'9 9 Shewbridge's basic job was to ensure a certain
district project was re-licensed, a task that gave him access to an
enormous amount of government documents. He also believed that
"he had a personal and ethical obligation as a professional engineer to
report wrong doing by the district and any potential danger to the
public."20
0
After complaining of alleged unethical and illegal actions by
one official, Shewbridge encountered "negative performance reviews,
suspension and eventually termination" allegedly as "a pretext to si-
lence him in retaliation for reporting wrongdoing by management of-
ficials., 20 1 Applying Garcetti, the court framed the issue as "whether
the plaintiff spoke as a citizen or an employee. 20 2 After recounting
the analysis from Garcetti regarding the analysis of job descriptions,
the court observed that unlike Garcetti, there was "a factual dispute
concerning whether the plaintiff's speech was made pursuant to his
' Id. at 517. The Ninth Circuit appears to have applied similar reasoning in Freitag. See
supra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
198 2006 WL 3741878 (E.D. Cal. 2006).
'99 Shewbridge, 2006 WL 3741878 at *1.
200 Id.
201 Id. at *1-3.102 Id. at *5.
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ordinary job duties., 20 3
The court emphasized the complete lack of any evidence that
Shewbridge was under an official duty to report misconduct, and was
unpersuaded by the argument that his subjective beliefs of"an obliga-
tion to report wrongdoing" rendered him subject to the Garcetti job-
description analysis.2° Shewbridge did not testify that such reporting
fell within his job duties; he testified that under California regulations
governing engineers, he believed he had a professional and ethical
obligation to report wrong doing. "[P]laintiff clearly disputed that his
speech in this case fell within any specific job duties that he had for"
the district.20 5 Shewbridge demonstrates how there can be legitimate
factual disputes about what is covered by job duties, and unless de-
fendants carry their burden to demonstrate that such speech was pur-
suant to official duties, summary judgment may be inappropriate.
IV. PRACTICAL ISSUES UNDER GARCETTI
Under Garcetti, one of the critical questions is determining
the employee's official duties. This essentially appears to be a ques-
tion of fact. The following is a suggested list of items for considera-
tion in addressing this crucial question:
1. Official Job Description. This is more theoretical than ac-
tual because day-to-day work duties, in many cases, are vastly differ-
ent from the theoretical structure set forth in a written job description.
2. Documents Relating to Hiring. These include, but are not
203 Id. at *6.
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limited to, communications regarding the proposed job, offer and ac-
ceptance communications, and any other documents memorializing
employment-related matters, such as duties, obligations, and func-
tions.
3. The Custom and Practice of the Particular Job. Examin-
ing anything that pertains to the actual functions of the particular job
is critical, especially anything relating to communications for report-
ing improper activities. An insightful question appears to be whether
the employee would ordinarily communicate on the particular topic
that is the subject of the speech dispute.
4. Other Personnel Documents. These items may vary but
include any action plans, performance evaluation reports, letters of
commendation, and any all other documents which might reflect on
actual work duties.
5. Manuals. Any manual or other documents that memorial-
ize personnel and related policies are essential to consider.
6. State Administrative Codes or Statutes that Define Job Du-
ties. Public employees' duties and obligations are often set out, at
least in part, in various statutes or administrative codes.
7. Codes of Ethics. While some employees are strictly sub-
ject to codes of ethics, others appear discretionary and unenforceable.
A number of these codes suggest or require the reporting of improper
activities and may have implications with respect to an employees'
official duties or reporting functions.
From examining all of these documents, the question in light
of Garcetti is whether there is a duty to communicate by the particu-
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lar employee in the area of the speech in question. It may also be
helpful to examine whether, in the past, the employer imposed any
discipline for not reporting and communicating in the area of inquiry.
V. CONCLUSION
Retaliation has been a longstanding problem in American public
bureaucracies. Richard Ceballos and Shirlie Green appear to be two
representative examples of honorable public servants who communi-
cated about serious wrongs and were consequently punished. For many
decades, the Supreme Court interpreted the First Amendment to afford
protection for public employees who communicated about a broad
range of misconduct within public agencies. Through those years, the
First Amendment was an effective tool to combat retaliation against
whistleblowers. Garcetti fundamentally changed this settled doctrine.
Most whistleblowers must now resort to alternative sources of protec-
tion. Garcetti is inconsistent with fundamental cornerstones of Ameri-
can constitutional law.
The result of Garcetti and its progeny is a more dangerous
America. Government corruption and malfeasance will undoubtedly
increase. Abusive bureaucrats well understand the Garcetti rule. They
understand they can likely retaliate against those who might dare dis-
agree with them without having to defend themselves in federal court.
The Thurmond doctrine has returned to America through five justices
on the Supreme Court. More than 18 million American public employ-
ees are now at greater risk of retaliation and are left without First
Amendment protection for whistleblowing about a vast range of corrup-
tion and malfeasance in America.
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